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Hubbard v. Boelt: The Fireman's Rule Extended
The California Supreme Court, in Hubbard v. Boelt, extended the reach
of thefireman's rule to bar a suit brought by a policeman who was injured
by the willful and wanton conduct of a speeding motoris while pursuing
that motorist. This is an important development in tort law because, tradi-
tionally, the fireman's rule had only been applied to bar suits by firemen
and policemen who were injured by the negligent conduct of another which
was the cause of their presence at the scene. This author suggests that the
majority's rationale underlying this extension was flawed because of the
fundamental difference between negligent conduct and willful and wanton
conduct. Even if the majority's logic was correct the rule should not have
been applied in this case. Two of the reasons for this, which the dissent
pointed out are the two independent acts of misconduct by the defendant,
one negligent and one willful and wanton, and that the policeman seemed
to be a member of a statutorily protected class. Finally, the author looks to
other jurisdictions and finds that the fireman's rule has never been applied
in cases where a policeman is injured while pursuing a speeding motorist.
Instead, the cases had always been decided on the general principles of
negligence.
L INTRODUCTION
As the flames of a fire hungrily begin to consume a house, a fire
engine quickly arrives and the firemen begin attempting to put
the fire out. During the course of extinguishing the fire, one of the
firemen is overcome by smoke and falls, severely injuring himself.
If the homeowner had been negligent in causing the fire, could
the fireman sue for the injuries he suffered? After all, the home-
owner's negligence caused the fire, and the smoke from the fire
caused the fireman to fall and injure himself. The law has long
been that negligence' can furnish no basis of liability for an ac-
tion by a professional fireman or policeman injured in the course
of duty. This is the so called "fireman's rule."
1. A good definition of negligence is:
either the omission of a person to do something which an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have done under given circumstances or the doing of
something which an ordinarily prudent person would not have done under
such circumstances. It is not absolute or to be measured in an cases in
accordance with some precise standard but always relates to some cir-
cumstance of time, place and person ....
Fouch v. Werner, 99 Cal. App. 557, 564, 279 P. 183, 186 (1929) (quoting a jury instruc-
tion given in the case).
In California, in order for there to be a cause of action for negligence, the inju-
ries incurred by the plaintiff 'Must have been reasonably foreseeable by the de-
fendant at the time of the act in question. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
In the case of Hubbard v. Boelt,2 the California Supreme Court
extended the reach of the fireman's rule to bar, not only causes of
action based on negligence, but also those based on willful and
wanton conduct.3 In Hubbard the court applied the rule to the
willful and wanton conduct of a driver speeding to evade getting a
ticket from a police officer. The policeman's cause of action, for
injuries sustained in an accident caused by the high speed chase,
was barred by this extention of the fireman's rule.
One of the purposes of this note is to examine the fundamental
underpinnings of the fireman's rule and to question their contin-
ued validity. These underpinnings are: (1) that firemen and po-
licemen assume the risk of being injured by certain negligent and
willful and wanton conduct because of the dangerous nature of
their jobs; (2) that fireman and policemen are adequately com-
pensated for facing such risks; and (3) that public policy requires
this rule be imposed on firemen and policemen. Secondly, this
note will examine the flaws in the majority's application of the
rule in this case; namely that there were two independent acts of
misconduct by the defendant, and that policemen should have
been designated as a statutorily protected class for this type of
willful and wanton conduct. Finally, this note will offer the alter-
nate policy of speeder liability, a policy already adopted in many
jurisdictions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The fireman's rule has a long history. In the 1892 case of Gibson
v. Leonard,4 the court held that firemen were mere licensees
when they entered private premises to perform their public du-
2. 28 Cal. 3d 480, 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1980). The City of San Diego
intervened in support of the policeman's action and filed a separate claim against
the defendant for reimbursement of worker's compensation and disability benefits
(a claim not involved in this appeal).
3. An act can be described as "wilful and wanton" misconduct if:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another [or
wilful or wanton misconduct] if he does an act or intentionally fails to do
an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that
his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but
also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to
make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The main difference between will-
ful and wanton conduct and negligent conduct is that in the former the actor
knows or has reason to know that his conduct is creating an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to another which is substantially greater than it would be if he
were acting negligently.
4. 143 Mll. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892), overruled, Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 170
N.E.2d 881 (1960). During the course of extinguishing a fire several firemen got
into a freight elevator and were lowered to the basement. Shortly before reaching
the basement the rope on which the elevator was suspended broke, causing the
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ties. The court's rationale was that a fireman had an implied li-
cense or permission by law to enter the premises to save the
property. Furthermore, the law was well established that "a mere
naked license or permission to enter premises does not impose an
obligation on the owner or person in possession to provide against
the dangers of accident. . ... 5 No duty was owed the firemen by
the landowner or occupier, other than to refrain from willful and
wanton infliction of injuries. 6 The court's line of reasoning in
defining firemen as licensees is questionable. 7 However, this be-
came the all but universal rule8 until 1920 when the New York
Court of Appeals, in Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, rejected the
rule.9 The court observed that the fireman
entered by a driveway prepared for the use of those who had business
with the defendant. Such persons at least were invited to use it. For their
use he might assume that it was reasonably safe .... [The fireman] took
the pathway that was apparently prepared for those who needed to go [to
the barn]. In such a case we hold that some obligation rested on the
owner.
1 0
The duty owed by the landowner to the fireman was that of "rea-
sonable care under all the circumstances.""
After the Meiers decision, the licensee concept was frequently
challenged.12 For instance, it was held that when an owner or oc-
elevator to crash down on the basement floor. One of the fireman's legs was so
severely injured that it had to be amputated.
5. Id. at 190, 32 N.E. at 184.
6. Id. at 189, 32 N.E. at 184.
7. See Comment, Are Firemen or Policemen Licensees or Invitees? 35 MIcH. L.
REV. 1157 (1937). The Gibson Court relied on a passage from T. Cooley, Torts 313
(lst ed. 1880), which did not "distinguish between bare licensees and business in-
vitees, but includes all forms of permission to enter upon the land of another...
under the headings 'Express Licensees' and 'Implied Licensees.'" 35 MICH. L.
REV. at 1159. Firemen or policemen enter the land of another independent of invi-
tation or consent and therefore "it is highly illogical to say that [a fireman or po-
liceman] cannot be an invitee because there has been no invitation, but can be a
licensee even though there has been no permission." Id.
8. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 629 (lst ed. 1941).
9. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920). In that case
a fire began one night in the defendant's barn. The plaintiff fireman while walking
briskly up the driveway fell in a coal hole injuring himself. The court pointed out
that firemen could not be bare licensees because a bare licensee's right to be on
the property depended on the owner's consent, and here there was no such con-
sent. On the other hand, firemen were not invitees because there had been no in-
vitation by the landowner. Nevertheless, the court decided that firemen had a
right to be there and use the driveway. Id. at 15, 127 N.E. at 492-93.
10. Id. at 15, 127 N.E. at 492-93.
11. Id. at 16, 127 N.E. at 493.
12. For a more in-depth discussion of the evolution of the fireman's rule, see
Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1962).
cupier of land was aware of an unusual hazard and had the oppor-
tunity to warn, he had a duty to warn firemen of the hazard.'3
Other courts stated that landowners and occupiers could be held
liable to firemen for active negligence,' 4 failure to warn of hidden
dangers,15 statutory violations, x6 failure to keep means of access
in a reasonably safe condition17 and willful and wanton conduct.' 8
Illinois entirely rejected the classification of licensee and declared
the fireman performing his duty to be an invitee.19 Kentucky,
13. Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d 503 (1940), reh.
denied, 285 N.Y. 614, 33 N.E.2d 547 (1941).
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955). The
court defined the fireman as a licensee who takes the premises how he finds it.
Possessor owed no duty to a licensee except to refrain from wantonness, inten-
tional wrong and active negligence. The failure to warn the fireman of a defective
porch was not active negligence. If the owner "had urged ... [the fireman] and
the other firemen to go on the porch we would have a different case and circum-
stances under which active negligence could be claimed." Id. at 365 Mo. at -,
282 S.W.2d at 450. Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N.E.2d 686 (1935) (judgment
for fireman because defendant had restricted the size of a vent on a gasoline tank,
which exploded and injured the fireman, and he told the fireman that the area was
safe).
15. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d
549 (1951) (failure to warn fireman, when owner or occupier had the opportunity,
that wall could not withstand lateral pressure of any amount); Beedenbender v.
Midtown Properties, 4 A.D.2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957) (landowner or occupier
must warn policeman of dangerous conditions on the premises if he knows of the
policeman's presence and believes he is unaware of the danger). See also
Netherton v. Arends, 81 Ill. App. 2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (1967); Anavaris v. Eisen-
berg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965). For a discussion of Shypuski see Negli-
gence-Property Owner or Occupier's Duty to Warn Firemen of Hidden Dangers of
Which He Has Knowledge and an Opportunity to Give Warning, 35 Mimi. L. REV.
512 (1951) and Torts-Negligence-Duty of Landowner to Fireman, 12 U. Prrr. L. REV.
646 (1951).
16. See, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) (building own-
er liable for fireman's injuries when the building did not have fire doors, fire extin-
guishers, or enclosed stair wells, and where oil rags and waste were not kept in
approved waste cans, all in violation of the municipal code); Maloney v. Hearst
Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d 296 (1937) (operator of a painting establish-
ment held liable for death of a fireman killed by an explosion of paints or chemical
compounds, which were kept on the premises in violation of two city ordinances).
Contra, e.g. Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc. 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1964);
Wax v. Coop. Ref. Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707 (1951); Aldworth v. F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936).
17. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text. 4 A.D.2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d
276. See generally Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as
a Matter of Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L REV. 407,
409-17 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Bandoxz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930) (keeping excess
amounts of benzol, ether and gas, in violation of statute, and splashing benzol on
the floor about a foot and a half away from a lighted hot-water heater, constituted
willful and wanton conduct, resulting in fireman's death).
19. 20 Ill. 2d at 415-16, 170 N.E.2d at 885-86. The major distinction between be-
ing a licensee or invitee is that the invitee is on the premises for the benefit of
both the landowner and invitee, whereas a licensee is there merely for his own
benefit. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1160-61. The court in Dini relied on this
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New Jersey and Minnesota adopted neither the licensee nor invi-
tee label, but defined firemen as occupying a status sui generis.20
The above exceptions to the fireman's rule as established in the
Gibson case obviously expanded the liability exposure of the
landowner or occupier and provided for recovery for firemen and
policemen in many situations. However, despite these exceptions
and redefinitions, most states did and still do refuse to impose lia-
bility on the landower or occupier if his only negligence was to
cause the fire which necessitated the fireman's presence and
proximately caused his injuries.2 1 This rule might be better de-
fined as denying a fireman's or policeman's cause of action
against one whose only negligence was to cause a situation for
which the officer was summoned, and in which he was subse-
quently injured.22 This rule has won almost universal accept-
ance, 23 and, in California and other states, it has been based on
public policy and/or assumption of risk.24
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
On February 28, 1977, the plaintiff Hubbard, an on-duty San Di-
ego police officer, was operating speed detection equipment while
parked at a roadside. Defendant Boelt's vehicle registered a
speed of fifty miles per hour, violating the twenty-five mile per
hour speed limit. Hubbard immediately activated his emergency
lights and siren and began pursuit. In response to this, Boelt ac-
celerated to a high speed, which at one point reached 100 miles
per hour, in order to avoid arrest. While passing another car on a
blind curve, Boelt collided with a third vehicle, causing debris to
distinction in defining firemen as invitees. 20 Il1. 2d at 416, 170 N.E.2d at 885. See
Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, 902, 466 P.2d 545, 548 (1970).
20. 380 S.W.2d at 98; 232 Minn. at 396, 45 N.W.2d at 550; Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J.
270, 273, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960); 4 A.D.2d at 281, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 280. "Sui generis"
can be defined as "of its own kind or class; i.e. the only one of its kind; peculiar."
Black's Law Dictionary 1286 (5th ed. 1979). The above courts used this term be-
cause they felt firemen and policemen did not readily fit into either the "licensee"
or "invitee" categories.
21. See Note, supra note 17, at 419. See, e.g., 380 S.W.2d 96; Aravanis v. Eisen-
berg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960). The rationale
behind this rule will be discussed extensively in this note.
22. 28 Cal. 3d at 484, 620 P.2d at 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
23. See generally notes 4-21 supra and the cases cited therein; Comment, An
Examination of the California Fireman's Rule, 6 PAC. LJ. 660, 663 (1975).
24. See Comment, supra note 23, at 663; Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 204-06,
571 P.2d 609, 612-13, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155-56 (1977).
be scattered over the roadway. Hubbard, who was pursuing at a
high rate of speed, was injured when he attempted to avoid the
debris by driving his car up a grass enbankment. The entire
chase occurred within a half mile distance and lasted less than
one minute.25
Hubbard sued Boelt, alleging that Boelt's negligent and reck-
less driving proximately caused his injuries. The trial court dis-
missed Hubbard's action after granting Boelt's motion for
summary judgment, based upon the California fireman's rule as
defined in Walters v. Sloan.26
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority began by stating, "it is the business of a fireman
or policeman to deal with particular hazards, and that accordingly
'he cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the very occa-
sion for his engagement.' "27 The majority followed the rationale
underlying the fireman's rule, which was clearly analyzed and es-
tablished by the California Supreme Court in Walters.28 The first
underlying basis of the rule is assumption of risk.29 In other
25. 28 Cal. 3d at 483-84, 620 P.2d at 157-58, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
26. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977). In Walters, a police-
man had attempted to arrest a minor who was intoxicated in public, but the officer
was precluded from recovering for injuries he sustained in that attempt. The of-
ficer had alleged that his injuries were a result of the defendant's minor daugh-
ter's unlawful serving of alcoholic beverages in the defendant's residence. The
policeman had brought suit against the owners of the house.
27. 28 Cal. 3d at 484, 620 P.2d at 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708 quoting in part from
Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 359, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119, 122
(1968).
28. The court in Walters upheld the fireman's rule upon two grounds. The first
ground was on the principle that "one who has knowingly and voluntarily con-
fronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby." 20 Cal. 3d at 204,
571 P.2d at 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155. This the court termed "a principle as funda-
mental to our law today as it was centuries ago." Id. The second basis for the fire-
man's rule, the court said, was public policy. Stated another way, policemen and
firemen cannot complain of negligence which creates the very occasions for which
they are hired. The court reasoned that public safety officers were already spe-
cially compensated for the dangers they face by way of higher pay and specific
statutory benefits, in addition to the usual medical and disability benefits which
public employees get under the Workman's Compensation Act. Id. at 205-06, 571
P.2d at 612-13, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56. Furthermore, the court agreed "it would be
too burdensome to charge all who carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires with the
injuries suffered by the expert retained with public funds to deal with those inevi-
table, although negligently created, occurrences." Id. at 205, 571 P.2d at 612, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 155 (quoting from Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129, 130-31
(1960)). So, because public safety officers knowingly and voluntarily confront
these negligently created risks, for which they are well paid and compensated, and
because the burden of liability on those who negligently create these risks would
be too great, the court in Walters upheld the fireman's rule.
29. The theory behind assumption of risk is that the defendant's conduct in-
volves certain dangers or risks, which the plaintiff voluntarily accepts. See Morton
[Vol. 9:197, 1981] Fireman's Rule Extended
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words, one who knowingly and voluntarily confronts a hazard
cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby.30 Public policy is
the other basis established.31 The Walters court felt that firemen
and policemen are presumably adequately compensated (by spe-
cial salary, retirement and disability benefits, and special statu-
tory benefits) for undertaking their hazardous work and,
therefore, should be precluded from bringing tort actions based
on negligence for injuries sustained from hazards they are paid to
deal with.3 2
In extending the fireman's rule to willful and wanton conduct,
the majority relied mainly on three arguments. They argued that
the tort principle of assumption of risk and public policy could be
applied to willful and wanton conduct just as they had previously
been applied to negligent conduct in Walters. To support these
contentions, the majority presented their third argument, that the
fireman's rule had already been applied to willful and wanton
conduct. These three arguments will be examined in detail, start-
ing with the contention that the fireman's rule had already been
applied to willful and wanton conduct.
The Hubbard court, relying on the Walters case and rationale,
stated that assumption of risk, adequate compensation and public
policy "seemingly would apply whether [the] defendant's conduct
was reckless or merely negligent in nature."33 The court's reason-
ing was that it would be rather strange if in facing substantially
identical risks recovery was "to depend solely upon the nature of
[the] defendant's conduct in creating that risk."34 But the court
then failed to adequately discuss two very crucial issues. Do po-
v. California Sports Car Club, 163 Cal. App. 2d 685, 688, 329 P.2d 967, 969 (1958);
Comment, Liability of Exhibitors to Spectators at Public Exhibitions; Assumption
of Risk, 24 CALIF. L. REV 429 (1936); Comment, Voluntary Assumption of Risk-Con-
tributory Negligence-Injuries to Patrons at Places of Amusement, 10 S. CAIF. L
REV. 67 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1966). The distinguish-
ig factor between assumption of risk and contributory negligence as defenses in
tort actions is the element of knowledge. This difference is well described in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A comment d (1965): "A subjective stan-
dard is applied to assumption of risk, in determining whether the plaintiff knows,
understands, and appreciates the risk. An objective standard is applied to contrib-
utory negligence, and the plaintiff is required to have the knowledge, understand-
ing, and judgment of the standard reasonable man."
30. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. 20 Cal. 3d at 204-06, 571 P.2d at 612-13, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
33. 28 Cal. 3d at 484, 620 P.2d at 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
34. Id.
licemen assume the risk of being injured by willful and wanton
conduct? Are the risks created by negligent, and willful and wan-
ton conduct substantially identical?
The court, answering both these questions in the affirmative, re-
lied solely upon the case of Holden v. Chunestudey.35 In Holden,
the defendant was driving while intoxicated. His truck crashed
into a tree on the side of a freeway and came to rest on a hillside.
Sometime later, the plaintiff police officer arrived at the scene of
the accident and injured himself when he fell while climbing the
hill.36 The court assumed that the defendant's driving while in-
toxicated constituted willful or wanton conduct 37 and was the
proximate cause of the police officer's injuries. The Hubbard
court's reliance on Holden was misplaced because Holden simply
reiterated the reasons which were established in Walters3 8 and
stated that "accordingly, we apply the principles enunciated in
Walters to willful and wanton misconduct."3 9 This, however, to-
tally evaded the issue because in Walters the conduct in question
was negligent, not willful, wanton or reckless; the Walters court
never discussed extending the fireman's rule to willful or wanton
conduct. In fact, the Walters court specifically said that "[o] ther
negligent conduct or willful misconduct may create liability to the
injured fireman or policeman."40
It was very questionable for the Holden court to extend the fire-
man's rule to willful 6r wanton conduct without any meaningful
analysis and discussion when the Walters case, which it relied on,
had specifically left the question open. Consequently, the Hub-
bard majority committed the same error in relying on Holden, a
case which is devoid of any meaningful discussion on what the
ramifications might be of such an extention of the fireman's rule.
V. AsSUMIrON OF RISK
Assumption of risk4l generally includes three main categories. 42
35. 101 Cal. App. 3d 959, 161 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1980).
36. Id. at 961, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
37. Id. The court cited Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854,
157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1974), for this assumption. The court in Taylor stated that:
One who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume al-
coholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset
that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the
words of Dean Prosser, 'such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the
interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.'
Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
38. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 961-62, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27.
39. Id. at 962, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
40. 20 Cal. 3d at 202 n.2, 571 P.2d at 611 n.2, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.2.
41. See note 29 supra.
42. The first category is the situation whereby the plaintiff expressly agrees or
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The one which is normally involved with the fireman's rule is the
plaintiff assuming a risk by voluntarily encountering a known, ex-
isting danger created by the defendant's negligence. 43 This will-
ingness to take a chance is said to be "implied" or tacitly
manifested." The majority in Hubbard stated that this is a fun-
damental tort principle.45 However, with the adoption of compar-
ative negligence in California46 and elsewhere, 47 the viability of
the implied assumption of risk has been questioned.46
gives his consent, in advance of the defendant's negligence, to relieve the defend-
ant from the obligations arising from a known risk to the plaintiff. W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 450 (3rd ed. 1964). See, e.g., Gonzales v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 318
F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1963) (accepting a gratuitous pass on a railway train);
O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958)
(entering into a lease); Moss v. Fortune, 207 Tenn. 426, 340 S.W.2d 902 (1960) (rent-
ing a horse); Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947)
(employing an agent), overruled on other grounds, 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115
(1974). The second category is the situation whereby the plaintiff impliedly as-
sumes a risk by voluntarily entering into some relationship with the defendant,
which necessarily involves a known risk to the plaintiff. The defendant will be re-
lieved of any obligations toward the plaintiff arising from the risk. W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 450 (3rd ed. 1964). See, e.g., Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club
Inc., 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942) (spectator at a baseball game); Lumsden v.
L-A. Thompson Scenic Ry. Co., 130 A.D. 209, 114 N.Y.S. 421 (1909) (riding on a
roller coaster); Ven Rooy v. Farmers Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 374, 92
N.W.2d 771 (1958) (riding in a car with an intoxicated driver).
43. See W. Prosser, supra note 41, at 451. Prosser uses the example of "an em-
ployee furnished with an unsafe machine continues to work with it after he has
discovered the danger, or a customer who enters a store and finds the floor is slip-
pery but proceeds nevertheless to walk across it." Id.
44. Id.
45. 28 Cal. 3d at 485, 620 P.2d at 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
46. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
In Li, the plaintiff made a left turn 70 feet before an intersection to enter a service
station driveway. The defendant, coming in the opposite direction, passed through
the intersection when the traffic light was yellow and struck the rear of the plain-
tiff's car as it turned in front of him. The trial court found the plaintiff to be con-
tributorily negligent in turning in front of the defendant's oncoming car.
Therefore, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant.
47. See Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 CALIF. L REV. 239, 239 n.1, 240 n.4 (1976).
48. Id. at 260-67. It is argued that it is one thing to permit a person to forego
his rights to legal protection by expressly assuming a risk, but quite another to
infer such a willingness from conduct alone where there is no unequivocal expres-
sion. Id. at 264. Thus, it has been urged that
merely encountering a known hazard and so consenting to the risk of be-
ing hurt would not suffice; in order to defeat a plaintiff entirely, he must
be shown to have consented to run the risk at his own expense so that he,
not the negligent defendant, should bear the loss in the event of an
accident.
Id. at 266. This is the prevailing English view. J. FLEMING, LAW OF TORTS ch. 11
(4th ed. 1971). This view seems even more equitable where willful and wanton
A. Affect of Comparative Negligence on Assumption of Risk
The California Supreme Court, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,49 dis-
carded the rule that contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery in a negligence action.50
In its place, the court adopted the rule of comparative negli-
gence.51 Under this rule, "in all actions for negligence resulting in
injury to person or property, the contributory negligence of the
person injured ... shall not bar recovery, but the damages
awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering."5 2 This development
was significant as far as the defense of assumption of risk is con-
cerned because the defenses of assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence overlap. For instance, a "plaintiff's conduct in
encountering a known risk may be in itself unreasonable, because
the danger is out of all proportion to the advantage which he is
seeking to obtain. ... 53 If that is the case, we are dealing with
contributory negligence, not assumption of risk, because the neg-
ligence consists of "making the wrong choice and voluntarily en-
countering a known unreasonable risk."54 The court in Li ruled
that "the defense of assumption of risk is ... abolished to the ex-
tent that it is merely a variant of the former doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence; [this is] to be subsumed under the general
process of accessing liability in proportion to negligence."55
A policeman's conduct in encountering a risk caused by the
willful, wanton or reckless conduct of another could be argued to
fall within this overlapping area. Is the danger in a high speed
chase out of all proportion to what the policeman is seeking,
namely a speeding citation? If such conduct on the part of a po-
liceman is considered but a variant of contributory negligence, it
conduct is concerned. Because the degree of danger imposed with willful and
wanton conduct is usually greater than that imposed by negligent conduct, it is
less likely that someone would agree to assume that danger or risk. Implying such
consent or agreement when the risk is so increased seems even more questionable
than implying it when the conduct is negligent in nature.
49. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See note 46 supra.
50. 13 Cal. 2d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
51. There are two forms of comparative negligence. One is called the "pure"
form because it apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases. The
second form applies apportionment based on fault up to a point where the plain-
tiff's fault is greater than or equal to the defendant's fault. When this point is
reached the plaintiff is barred from recovery. This is referred to as the "50% sys-
tem." The Li court adopted the "pure" form. Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 875.
52. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
53. See W. Prosser, supra note 42, at 451.
54. Id.
55. 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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was abolished as a valid defense in the Li case and should no
longer be used to support the fireman's rule.
B. The Police Officer's Duty to Act
Assumption of risk has also been found inapplicable where the
plaintiff is under a duty to act and cannot avoid the risk. In
Bilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines,5 6 a truck driver drove negli-
gently, causing his trailer to upset, spilling heavy rolls of steel on
the highway. While pushing these rolls off the highway, a high-
way patrolman injured himself. There was no discussion of the
fireman's rule, and the court ruled that the patrolman had not vol-
untarily accepted the risk involved with pushing the steel rolls off
the highway.5 7
He was under an obligation to clear the highway of obstructions. His
choice, being dictated by a legal and moral duty .... Moreover, even
though the plaintiff may have had knowledge of the risk involved in push-
ing and pulling heavy rolls of steel, it cannot be said as a matter of law
that he appreciated the magnitude of that risk. Under such circumstances
the doctrine [of assumption of risk] does not apply.5 8
In the Hubbard case, the officer was also under a legal and
moral duty to pursue Boelt. He did not do it voluntarily. Did
Hubbard really appreciate the magnitude of the risk involved? If
he had known there would be an accident in which he would be
injured, would he still have pursued? The Bilyeu decision indi-
cates that these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative
as a matter of law, and that, therefore, the doctrine of assumption
of risk does not apply to this type of situation.
C. Erosion of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine
The defense of assumption of risk has been completely abol-
ished in many employment areas. For example, the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act59 and the California Labor Code6O have done
just that in master and servant cases which are still governed by
56. 182 Cal. App. 2d 536, 6 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1960).
57. Id. at 539-40, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67.
58. Id. at 545, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
59. In 1939, Congress amended the Federal Employers Liability Act to provide
that an "employee shall not be held to have assumed the risk of his employment
in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negli-
gence of the officer, agents, or employees of such carrier .... " 45 U.S.C. § 54
(1972). This occurred after endless litigation over the dividing lines between the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. See Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943). The Court there held "that every vestige of the
common law principles of tort liability. Similarly, the California
Supreme Court totally abrogated the defense from all actions for
violation of a statute in Finnegan v. Royal Realty Company.6 1
The court stated that "an ordinance enacted for the public good
cannot be contravened by private agreement. Public policy re-
quires that duties imposed by statute be discharged and that
those who are affected cannot suspend the operation of the law
either by waiver or by express contract." 62
Therefore, because of the Finnegan decision, one cannot ex-
pressly contract with another party, relieving that party from any
liability towards him, if the party injures him in the course of vio-
lating a statute. Nor can one waive his right to sue that person, if
that person injures him while violating a statute.
Finally, while some courts still permit assumption of risk as a
complete defense (barring all recovery for the plaintiff),63 there
are also some distinguished commentators who advocate,64 and
several courts 65 which have adopted, an abolition of the defense
doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by the 1939 amend-
ment . . . ." Id. at 58.
60. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2801 (West 1971) provides in part:
It shall not be a defense that:
(a) The employee either expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of the
hazard complained of.
(b) The injury or death was caused in whole or in part by the want of
ordinary or reasonable care of a fellow servant.
No contract, or regulation, shall exempt the employer from any provisions
of this section.
61. 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950) (involving police regulations, i.e. ordi-
nances designed to protect human life).
62. Id. at 431, 218 P.2d at 31. See also CAl. Crv. CODE § 1668 (West 1975) which
states in part: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to
exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the per-
son or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are
against the policy of the law." In construing this statute, courts have concluded
that an exculpatory provision can be valid only if it does not affect the "Public in-
terest." Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 96, 383 P.2d 441, 443, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 35 (1963). Violation of a statute presumptively involves the public inter-
est and is therefore not subject to exculpatory provisions.
Although the rule established in Finnegan has long been shared by English law,
see Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 669, 675 (C.A.), it is not
generally accepted in other states. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496F, com-
ment e, at 580 (1965).
63. This appears to be the position in Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Ne-
braska and South Dakota. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATiVE NEGLIGENCE 161-63
(1974).
64. See James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185
(1968); Symposium-Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 1 (1961) (hereinafter cited
asSymposium).
65. Several decisions rendered mostly prior to the introduction of comparative
negligence purported to abolish the defense of assumption of risk. See Hale v.
O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101 (Alaska 1971) (plaintiff had ridden horse six times before fall-
ing and was aware of dangerous proclivities); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attrac-
tion, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) (plaintiff injured while ice skating); Ritter v.
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of assumption of risk, unless there is an express assumption.
D. Do Negligent and Willful and Wanton Conduct Create the
Same Risks?
The majority failed to discuss whether the risks created by neg-
ligent, and willful and wanton conduct substantially identical?66
Perhaps in some situations they are, such as the Holden case.67
However, one need look no further than the facts of the Hubbard
case to see that they usually are not. In Holden, the accident had
already occurred when the officer arrived at the scene. Hence, the
primary danger caused by the driver's willful or wanton conduct,
the accident itself, was already past. Had the officer in Holden ac-
tually been pursuing the truck driver when the accident occurred,
the danger to the officer and all third parties would have been
much greater. The danger we are concerned with in cases of will-
ful and wanton conduct is the danger created for others when the
conduct is taking place, not after the conduct is over.
In Hubbard, after seeing the police officer, Boelt accelerated to
a speed of 100 miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone
in order to avoid receiving a speeding ticket. The risk of danger
and injury to the pursuing officer, other drivers and pedestrians at
Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961) (while testing a wheelchair ramp, em-
ployee fell and was injured); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d
767 (1962) (nurse injured while working in hospital). Other courts have, or seem
to have, approved "merger" of unreasonable assumption of risk (the risk to danger
far outweighs the benefits hoped to be gained by assuming it) into contributory
negligence, mostly after introduction of comparative negligence. See Frelick v. Ho-
meopathic Hosp. Ass'n of Delaware, 51 Del. 568, 150 A.2d 17 (1959) (plaintiff
tripped over a suspended chain in a parking lot when she could have easily
walked a short distance around it); Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125
(Iowa Sup. Ct. 1972) (child injured by fireworks display); Springrose v. Willmore,
292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971) (passenger injured in a car involved in a drag
race); Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975) (slip and
fall accident in grocery store); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515
P.2d 821 (1973) (tractor accident); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15
Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962) (Passenger injured in an automobile accident).
66. In referring to assumption of risk, the court stated "the foregoing princi-
ples ... seemingly would apply whether defendant's conduct was reckless or
merely negligent in nature: In both situations, the plaintiff voluntarily confronts
[the] hazard .... " 28 Cal. 3d at 484, 620 P.2d at 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708. The
court then went on to observe that the risks incurred by policemen and firemen in
both situations are "substantially identical." Id.
67. The risk to a policeman climbing an embankment is substantially identical
whether the car which drove over the embankment had been driven recklessly or
negligently. 101 Cal. App. 3d 959, 161 Cal. Rptr. 925.
this time was substantial, and certainly more than when he was
only driving negligently at fifty miles per hour.68 Furthermore,
the danger we are concerned with is that of driving at 100 miles
per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone, not the danger of
walking up to an accident which has already occurred. While it is
true that the conduct of the defendants in both Holden and Hub-
bard was willful and wanton, the danger to the police officer in
Hubbard was so much more immediate and threatening than that
created for the officer in Holden. Hubbard was pursuing the reck-
less driver when, the accident happened and was immediately
threatened thereby. On the other hand, the officer in Holden ar-
rived on the scene some time after the accident had occurred and
was not immediately threatened thereby. The real difference be-
tween the two cases is that the willful and wanton conduct in
Hubbard was a more immediate and threatening cause of the of-
ficer's injuries than was the willful and wanton conduct in
Holden. It is hard to understand how the majority could say that
the danger created by negligent and willful and wanton conduct is
identical, and how the danger created in Holden was even re-
motely similar to that created in Hubbard.
E. Do Police Assume the Risk of Willful and Wanton Conduct?
The majority obviously believed that officers assume the risk of
willful and wanton conduct.69 However, as Justice Tobriner
points out in his dissent, the same rationale could be utilized to
imply that policemen assume the risk of intentionally inflicted in-
juries and, therefore, should be denied recovery for those also.70
After all, policemen know when they are hired that some people
will intentionally try to harm or even kill them. What complicates
the majority's assumption of risk rationale is that, although a pro-
spective police officer knows the job will involve many risks, the
police officer's contractual agreement is reached long before he
encounters the dangerous situation requiring his professional
services. Consequently, it is difficult to establish that he volun-
tarily encountered a known, existing danger at the time the situa-
tion arose. This is especially so, since in light of the Bilyeu
decision, it is his legal and moral duty to act.
68. See generally, Note, Speeder Liability to Pursuing Police Officers--A New
Cause of Action, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 224 (1969) (the argument is made here for
recognizing a cause of action for policemen in such a situation). This will be dis-
cussed extensively infra in the Speeder Liability Section.
69. See note 66 supra.
70. "[If the majority confine[s] their analysis-as they have done in this
case-to the two broad policies which they equate with the fireman's rule, recov-
ery should logically be denied for even such intentionally inflicted injuries ......
28 Cal. 3d at 491, 620 P.2d at 162, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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Is this synonymous to voluntarily acting? A policeman will en-
gage in high speed chases because that is his job, and he is re-
quired to do so. It is highly doubtful that the same policeman
would engage in a high speed chase when he is off duty. How can
it then be said that a policeman voluntarily assumes the risk of
danger involved? If a police officer would not voluntarily assume
the risk as a private citizen, then the assumption is not truly vol-
untary. The police officer is assuming the risk because it is his
duty, not because he freely chooses to do so. The voluntariness of
the policeman's act is even more doubtful when the conduct of
the one creating the risk changes from negligent to willful, wan-
ton or reckless, and the corresponding danger increases propor-
tionately. Therefore, it has been suggested that there should be a
difference between those risks which a police officer agrees to
remedy or assume and those which he merely knowingly en-
counters, but does not voluntarily assume.71 Taking all the above
developments into consideration, it is far from clear that assump-
tion of risk remains a fundamental tort principle in California72
or, keeping in mind the Bilyeu decision, whether assumption of
risk should even have been applied in the Hubbard case.73 The
majority in Hubbard failed to make any sort of analysis consider-
ing the continued viability of this doctrine in our modern society.
In summary, by extending the fireman's rule to willful and wan-
ton conduct under such circumstances, the majority may have
committed a serious error.
VI. PUBUC POUCY
The majority also supported the extension of the fireman's rule
to willful and wanton conduct because of public poicy.7 4 Again
however, the majority mistakenly relied upon the public policy
established in Walters, a negligence case, whereas Hubbard was
dealing with reckless, willful or wanton conduct. This poses the
question as to whether public policy is served in denying police-
men and firemen a cause of action for injuries caused by willful or
71. Comment, Negligence Actions by Police Officers and Firefighters: A Need
for a Professional Rescuers Rule, 66 CALIF. L REV. 585 (1978) (hereinafter Profes-
sional Rescuers).
72. See notes 46-55 and 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
74. 28 Cal. 3d at 485, 620 P.2d at 158-59, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09 (following
Holden v. Chunestudey, 101 Cal. App. 3d 959, 961-62, 161 Cal. Rptr. 925, 926-27
(1980)).
wanton conduct, as well as for those caused by negligent conduct.
The public policy rationale the Hubbard court used was twofold.
A. Are Policemen Adequately Compensated
for the Risks They Face?
The first rationale was that firemen and policemen receive spe-
cial benefits and pay because of the dangers they encounter and,
therefore, should be denied a cause of action against those who
negligently or recklessly injure them.75 There are two fallacies to
this argument. First of all, the rationale underlying this rule is
that policemen and firemen are receiving adequate compensation
for inherent risks in their employment. If this were a valid argu-
ment, it would seem that all employees would be barred from
bringing a tort action whenever they are injured by a negligent or
reckless tortfeasor, and when the risk of such an injury is inher-
ent in their job. But such is not the case. "California courts have
permitted injured employees to maintain traditional tort actions
against third parties for virtually all negligently inflicted injuries
.... 76 For instance, highway workers, employees of construc-
tion subcontractors, high rise construction workers and mechan-
ics all face substantial inherent risks in their jobs for which
theoretically they all receive compensation. Yet, they have all
been allowed causes of action for negligently inflicted job inju-
ries.77 Why do policemen and firemen deserve second class
treatment?
Secondly, in addition to the Bilyeu 78 decision, there are two
other California decisions which demonstrate that the theoretical
compensation a policeman receives is not a sufficient basis for
barring a policeman's cause of action against a negligent or reck-
less tortfeasor. In Witt v. Jackson,79 the California Supreme
75. Id. at 485, 620 P.2d at 158-59, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
76. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 209, 571 P.2d 609, 615, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 158 (1977) (Tobriner,
J., dissenting).
77. For a highway worker's right to recover for injuries suffered as the result
of a third party's negligence, see, e.g., Scott v. City & County of San Francisco, 91
Cal. App. 2d 887, 206 P.2d 45 (1949); Roddy v. American Smelting etc. Co., 34 Cal.
App. 2d 457, 93 P.2d 841 (1939); Mecham v. Crump, 137 Cal. App. 200, 30 P.2d 568
(1934). For construction workers' right to recover tort damages for work-related
injuries, see, e.g., Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co., 69 Cal. 2d 452, 445
P.2d 881, 72 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1968); Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds, 57 Cal. 2d 651,
371 P.2d 311, 21 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1962). For mechanics' right to recover for job-re-
lated injuries, see, e.g., Housewright v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 2d
259, 40 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1964).
78. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
79. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
As Witt demonstrates, California courts have never viewed such benefits
as a justification for barring a police officer's tort recovery. The provision
of such special disability programs does not necessarily reflect an intent
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Court allowed a policeman, who while pulling another car to the
side of the road was struck from the rear by a third car, to recover
full tort damages from the negligent driver. This was despite the
fact that the policeman received workers' compensation for the
injury, as well as his normal pay and fringe benefits. Certainly
the risk of such an accident was inherent in the police officer's
job. Why should a cause of action be allowed in the Witt case,
where the tortfeasor's conduct was negligent, and be barred in
the Hubbard case, where the tortfeasor's conduct was reckless,
willful and wanton? In McAllister v. Cummings,8 0 a policeman
was in pursuit of a suspected traffic violator, just as in Hubbard.
A third party's car hit the policeman's motorcycle, injuring the po-
liceman. Although the risk of such an accident was unquestiona-
bly inherent in the officer's job, the court allowed recovery. In
fact, the court specifically states, "[t]here is no dispute ... about
the fact that the plaintiff was pursuing a lawbreaker. Hence there
was no basis for suggesting an assumption of risk with respect to
ordinary traffic hazards or for instructing the jury on that
subject."8 1
In the above three cases, policemen were allowed to maintain
tort actions for their injuries against negligent drivers. In Hub-
bard, Boelt was driving recklessly in willful and wanton disregard
for the safety of Hubbard and others, yet ironically, Hubbard was
not allowed to maintain a cause of action against Boelt.
B. Would Liability for Willful and Wanton Conduct
Be Overly Burdensome to Society?
The second basis for the public policy rationale which the Wal-
ters court relied on was strongly based upon the argument origi-
nally established in Krauth v. Geller.8 2 The court in Krauth
pointed out that most fires were probably caused by negligence,
to bar the individual officer's tort action, but rather may simply reflect the
fact that a policeman or fireman often sustains injury in the absence of de-
monstrable negligence or that even if negligence can be demonstrated,
tortfeasors are not always capable of paying for the damage they cause.
20 Cal. 3d at 213 n.3, 571 P.2d at 617-18 n.3, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61 n.3 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
80. 191 Cal. App. 2d 1, 12 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1961).
81. Id. at 11, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 424
82. 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960). In this case, a fireman was on a land-
owner's premises fighting a fire. The fireman went up a balcony on which the rail-
ing had not been installed. The fireman fell off, injuring himself.
and that "in the final analysis the policy decision is that it would
be too burdensome to charge all who carelessly cause or fail to
prevent fires with the injuries suffered by the expert retained
with public funds to deal with those inevitable, although negli-
gently created, occurrences. s83 The focus of the analysis seems to
be on the unfair burden the taxpayer would be faced with if he
negligently injured a policeman in the line of duty and had to pay
for his injuries, which theoretically the taxpayer had already paid
for through taxes.8 4
Whether this rationale85 is a valid one or not, it does not seem
to stand up once the conduct becomes reckless, willful and wan-
ton. It is probably true that many people may negligently injure a
policeman or fireman in the line of duty. But how many of those
same people would willfully and wantonly injure a police officer
or fireman? How great would the burden be on taxpayers in gen-
eral, if those few who willfully and wantonly injure a policeman
are forced to account for their behavior? It does not appear that
the fireman's rule was created for such a situation. 86 The rule was
originally designed to protect the innocent homeowner from lia-
bility for injuries a fireman might incur.87 It was not designed to
protect the landowner or occupier who is not innocent.8 8 As Jus-
tice Tobriner states in his dissent, the "majority's approach un-
hinges the fireman's rule from its traditional modest public policy
The Walters court relied on Krauth to support the contention that it would be
unduly burdensome on the taxpayers to expose them to liability to firemen in-
jured while fighting a fire, or policemen injured in the line of duty.
83. Id. at 274, 157 A.2d at 131.
84. 28 Cal. 3d 480, 492, 620 P.2d 156, 163, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706, 713 (dissent). See
Professional Rescuers, supra note 71, at 597. Justice Tobriner compares this con-
cept to that of insurance. The taxpayer theoretically pays taxes to the city for the
special benefits firemen and policemen receive, just like they would pay insurance
premiums to an insurance company. When the injuries do occur to the firemen or
policemen the argument goes that the taxpayer should not have to pay for their
injuries all over again. See 2 R. HARPER & F. JAMREs, THE LAw OF TORTS 1503-04
(1956).
85. In Walters, the majority decided that the means by which they are pre-
sumably paid are, besides their salaries, by special presumptions of industrial cau-
sation as to certain disabilities and special death benefits that apply to public
safety officers; they are entitled to optional leave of absence for up to one year
with full pay, and permanent disability benefits are fully payable despite retire-
ment. 20 Cal. 3d at 205-06, 571 P.2d at 613, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
86. Justice Tobriner stated that the limited public policy rationale at least had
"the virtue of confining the diminution of the rights of firemen and policemen
within somewhat tolerable limits and of relieving only the least culpable of
tortfeasors from liability for the officer's injuries." 28 Cal. 3d at 492, 620 P.2d at 163,
169 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (dissent). See Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 l. App. 494
(1930) (fireman's rule held not applicable to willful or wanton conduct).
87. See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text.
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rationale." 89 The majority has expanded the doctrine to relieve
"persons who know of a firefighter's or police officer's presence of
any duty to act with concern for the officer's safety or, indeed, of
any duty even to avoid reckless, willful or wanton misconduct
which poses an obvious danger to the officer."90 This is in direct
contradiction to the fireman's rule, as it existed before Hubbard,
under which it was established that once the policeman or fire-
man was present, the defendant "must, of course, refrain from in-
tentionally or wantonly injuring such officers." 91
In conclusion, the majority has extended the fireman's rule far
beyond its intended scope, without any real basis for doing so.
The assumption of risk rationale is a very questionable one on
which to base the extension, considering the modern attitude to-
ward assumption of risk, the quickly growing and developing doc-
trine of comparative negligence and this factual situation.
Likewise, the majority stretches the public policy rationale to the
breaking point. Case law does not support denying policemen or
firemen a cause of action for recklessly inflicted injuries just be-
cause they are theoretically compensated for those risks "inher-
ent" in their jobs. Finally, the extreme burden on the taxpayer in
imposing liability is simply nonexistent once the conduct be-
comes reckless, willful and wanton.
VII. DiSSENTMNG OPINION
The dissent 92 continued "to believe that the fireman's rule is in-
consistent with California's fundamental statutory and common
law tort principles .... ,"93 However, conceding that the rule is
89. 28 Cal. 3d at 492, 620 P.2d at 163, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (dissent).
90. Id.
91. Id. See R. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 84, at 1504. (This rule is con-
ceded by even the most reactionary jurisdictions); Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255
Ill. App. 494 (court also held that the statutes in question were meant to protect
firemen and any others who had a right to be on the property).
92. The dissent was written by Justice Tobriner, and Chief Justice Bird
concurred.
93. 28 Cal. 3d at 487, 620 P.2d at 160, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (dissent). See 20 Cal.
3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977) (dissent). Justice Tobriner did not
believe that there was sufficient California case law to support the argument that
the fireman's rule should apply simply because the injuries the fireman or police-
man incurred arose out of a foreseeable risk of his occupation. See notes 76-81
supra and accompanying text. He also rejected the argument that the fireman's
rule "spread the risk" of a fireman's or policeman's injuries among all taxpayers
instead of placing the entire burden on the negligent tortfeasor. He felt that the
rule did not spread the risk at all, but totally eliminated it. Firemen and police-
almost universally accepted,94 the dissent could still not agree
with the extension of the rule to willful and wanton conduct.
Writing the dissent, Justice Tobriner contended that the majority
transformed the fireman's rule from a restrained doctrine that simply pro-
tects the average homeowner or citizen from potentially severe liability
for mere acts of negligence in creating a situation as to which firemen and
policemen are employed to respond, into a sweeping, across-the-board
rule that forbids firemen and policemen from recovering any damages
from persons who, with knowledge of a safety officer's presence on the
scene, intentionally engage in willfull and wanton misconduct which re-
sults in serious injury to the officer.95
VIII. THE INDEPENDENT ACT
Aside from the majority's questionable rationale for extending
the rule to willful and wanton misconduct, the dissent observed 96
that the primary basis for permitting recovery in this case should
have been that there was an additional, independent act of mis-
conduct by Boelt after Hubbard arrived at the scene. As Justice
Tobriner stated, this independent act "foreseeably created a new
and additional risk of danger to the officer. .... ,,97
As the majority recognized,98 the fireman's rule does not apply
if the defendant's negligence in no way created the risk which
was the cause of the officer's presence and could not have pro-
vided any occasion for the officer's engagement at the time and
was, instead, the result of wholly independent factors.99 This rule
was recognized in the case of Kocan v. Garino.100 Even accepting
the majority's rationale for extending the fireman's rule to willful
and wanton conduct, based on the Kocan case and Bartholomew
v. Klingler Co. ,101 there seems to have been an independent act of
misconduct in the Hubbard case, and, therefore, the fireman's
rule should not have been applied.
men were denied all recovery except for workmen's compensation, which most
other employees could get in addition to their right to fie suit as individuals, for
their injuries. Therefore, firemen and policemen were required to bear a loss
which was not required of other employees. He also pointed out that in many
cases of a fire, for instance, the defendant would have liability insurance that
would cover a fireman's tort action. The insurance itself would be spreading the
risk of loss among all the policy holders. 20 Cal. 3d at 207-17, 571 P.2d at 614-20, 149
Cal. Rptr. at 157-63 (dissent). For another alternative to the fireman's rule, see Pro.
fessional Rescuers, supra note 71, at 605-09.
94. See note 23 supra.
95. 28 Cal. 3d at 487, 620 P.2d at 160, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (dissent).
96. Id. at 488, 620 P.2d at 160, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (dissent).
97. Id.
98. See note 108 infra.
99. Kocan v. Garino, 107 Cal. App. 3d 291, 295-96, 165 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714-15
(1980).
100. 107 Cal. App. 3d 291, 165 Cal. Rptr. 712.
101. 53 Cal. App. 3d 975, 126 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1975) (officer responding to a burglar
alarm fell through the defendant's ceiling while searching for possible intruders).
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In the Kocan case, a police officer was injured going over a
faulty fence while in pursuit of a felony suspect. The court held
that the officer could recover from the owner of the property
where the pursuit took place for negligently failing to maintain
the fence. The negligence of the defendant landowner, if any, the
court stated, was an independent act and not the cause of the of-
ficer's presence on the land to begin with, and that, therefore, the
fireman's rule did not apply.10 2 In the Hubbard case, the cause of
Hubbard's presence (original pursuit of Boelt) was Boelt's speed-
ing. That was the original act of misconduct. The injury to Hub-
bard did not occur at that point, it occurred later when Boelt
recklessly accelerated to approximately 100 miles per hour in or-
der to evade getting a ticket. The attempt to avoid the ticket was
an independent act of Boelt, separate and apart from his original
negligent speeding. That act, not the original negligent speeding,
was the cause of Hubbard's injuries. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, in the Walters case, has even recognized, hypothetically,
that a "police officer who while placing a ticket on an illegally
parked car is struck by a speeding vehicle may maintain an action
against the speeder .... ,,103 Hubbard is comparable to that situ-
ation because the police officer in Hubbard was injured by a
speeder, who was driving recklessly, while attempting to give a
ticket to that speeder.
A corollary to the independent act rule, which has long been ap-
plied to the fireman's rule, is that the defendant's negligence must
have been the cause of the officer's presence at the scene of the
accident.10 4 In the Bartholomewl0 5 case, the court held that if, af-
ter the police officer arrives on the scene, the property owner fails
to advise him of some hidden danger, which he knows of, and ulti-
102. 107 Cal. App. 3d at 295-96, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
103. 20 Cal. 3d at 202 n.2, 571 P.2d at 611 n.2, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 154 n.2.
104. See 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152; Scott v. E.L Yeager Con-
str. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1970); Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1968). The defendant's negligence
must have created a risk which is of the type usually dealt with by firemen and
policemen, and that risk created must have been the direct cause of the officer's
injury. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 1198-99, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 238. A fireman normally deals
with the risks of getting burned or inhaling smoke in a fire. He does not normally
deal with the risk of falling in a hole in a driveway as he walks up to fight a fire.
See note 9 supra and accompanying text. A policeman normally deals with risks
of being injured by a prowler, but he does not normally deal with the risk of falling
through a ceiling as he searches for that prowler. See notes 105 infra and 103
supra and accompanying text.
105. 53 Cal. App, 3d 975, 126 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1973).
mately causes the officer's injury, then the owner can be held lia-
ble to the officer.10 6 In the Hubbard case, Boelt knew that the
officer was on the scene, and that, by attempting to escape from
the officer as he did, he was exposing the officer to additional and
more dangerous risks. Therefore, Boelt's conduct was very simi-
lar to an independent act not associated with the officer's pres-
ence. Like failing to warn of a hidden danger, Hubbard was
exposed to additional and more dangerous risks than he would
have normally faced had Boelt's conduct been reasonable. In
other words, Boelt's reckless conduct was not the original cause
of Hubbard's presence, Boelt's negligent speeding was.
While both the majority and dissent agreed that this was willful
and wanton misconduct,107 they differed in that the majority did
not see the conduct as two independent acts.108 The Holden case,
upon which the majority relied, did not have separate acts of mis-
conduct. 0 9 Perhaps one of the problems the majority had in see-
ing two independent acts was that in Kocan, Bartholomew and
the court's own hypothetical example in Walters, the independent
acts of misconduct occurred after the officer arrived on the scene
and were committed by someone other than the one the police-
man was originally pursuing. In the Hubbard case, the time dif-
ferential between the officer's arrival and the defendant's attempt
to evade arrest was obviously not much. Nevertheless, the act of
106. "[If the owner knows of the presence on the premises of officially privi-
leged persons, such as firemen or policemen, is cognizant of a dangerous condition
thereon, and has reason to believe that they are unaware of the danger, he has a
duty to warn them of the condition and of the risk involved." Id. at 979, 126 Cal.
Rptr. at 193 (citing Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, 4 A.D.2d 276, 281, 164
N.Y.S.2d 276, 281 (1957)).
107. See 4 B. WrrxlN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAw 3025-27 (8th ed. 1974), for a sum-
mary of collected cases on willful and wanton misconduct.
108. The majority recognized that the fireman's rule was not intended to apply
to independent acts of misconduct which were not the cause of the officer's pres-
ence at the scene. See, e.g., Kocan v. Carino 107 Cal. App. 3d 291, 165 Cal. Rptr. 712
(1980). See notes 99-106 supra and 109-11 infra and accompanying text. However,
without any case support whatsoever, it is simply stated that the police officer
"was injured while pursuing a speeding traffic violator, and in [the] discharge of
his official duty incurred the very risk which occasioned his presence at the acci-
dent scene." 28 Cal. 3d at 486-87, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 709. This view is
particularly hard to reconcile with the McAllister case because the only difference
there was that the accident was caused by a third party, not the traffic violator the
police officer was pursuing. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
109. In Holden, the accident the officer was investigating was caused by the de-
fendant driving while intoxicated. This act of misconduct created the occasion for
the officer's presence on the scene. Since the officer arrived after the accident had
occurred, no greater risk was created whether the accident had resulted from will-
ful and wanton conduct or simple negligence. There was no independent act of
misconduct after the officer had arrived at the scene. Holden v. Chunestudey, 101
Cal. App. 3d 959, 161 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1980). To the contrary, in the Hubbard case,
there was a separate act of misconduct after the officer arrived on the scene and it
did expose him to a greater risk of injury and degree of danger.
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speeding and the act of evading arrest by driving recklessly can
be separated. Furthermore, simply because these two independ-
ent acts of misconduct were committed by the same person
should not have caused so much difficulty for the majority. In the
Kocan and Bartholomew cases, the courts focused on, not the
fact that the endangering act was committed by a party other
than the individual pursued, but rather that the act was in-
dependent of the one which originally caused the officer's pres-
ence and created a greatly increased risk to the officer. If the
majority had focused on Boelt's attempt to evade arrest, which
greatly increased the. risk involved for Hubbard, and not the origi-
nal cause of Hubbard's presence, Boelt's negligent speeding,
based on the Kocan and Bartholomew cases the fireman's rule
would not have been applied. In addition to his original speeding,
Boelt was also charged with violating three different code sec-
tions.110 This alone is sufficient evidence that there were separate
acts of misconduct by Boelt.11
Summarizing, it appears that the dissent has support in case
law for their contention" 2 that the fireman's rule has always been
very restricted in nature." 3 "IT]he fireman's rule has never been
viewed as totally eliminating an individual's duty to utilize due
care towards a fireman or policeman once the officer has already
arrived on the scene." 114 It is unquestionable that Boelt engaged
in a separate act of misconduct after Hubbard arrived and made
himself known.1 5 The conduct of attempting to evade arrest was
110. See notes 123-25 infra.
111. Id. Boelt was charged under CAL. VEH. CODE § 2800.1 for attempting to flee
from a pursuing officer after seeing his car and hearing his siren and under CAL.
PENAL CODE § 148 for willfully resisting an officer attempting to carry out his duty.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a was charged for using force in resisting arrest. These
three statutory violations are all separate and distinct from Boelt's original mis-
conduct of mere speeding.
112. 28 Cal. 3d 480, 487, 620 P.2d 156, 159-60, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710 (1980).
113. The fireman's rule has not been applied in cases of willful and wanton con-
duct, active negligence, failure to warn of hidden dangers, statutory violations, fail-
ure to keep means of access in a reasonably safe condition, or in cases where the
defendant's negligence occurred after the officer arrived at the scene and materi-
ally enhanced the risk of harm, or created a new risk of harm. See notes 9-18
supra and accompanying text. See generally Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner
Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L REV. 237
(1921).
114. 28 Cal. 3d at 488, 620 P.2d at 161, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (dissent). See notes
100-03 supra and accompanying text.
115. Hubbard made himself known to Boelt by immediately activating his
emergency lights and siren. 28 Cal. 3d at 483, 620 P.2d at 157, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
not just negligent, but was willful and wanton, and it exposed
Hubbard to a much higher degree of risk of injury to himself than
he normally would encounter in giving someone a speeding ticket.
Because there was a greater degree of risk created by an in-
dependent act of misconduct injuring Hubbard after he arrived at
the scene, the majority's reliance on the fireman's rule was un-
founded and misplaced.
IX. STATUTORY RIGHTS
It is well settled in California that if a statute is violated, there
is a presumption of negligence, absent justification or excuse, pro-
vided that the "person suffering ... the injury ... was one of the
class of persons for whose protection the statute ... was
adopted."116 A perfect example of this rule would be a violation
of any traffic ordinance. For instance, if a driver goes through a
red light, he would be presumed negligent if he collided with a car
passing through the green light in the opposite direction. There-
fore, another issue in Hubbard was, since Boelt was presumed
negligent for his statutory violations, did Hubbard, as a police-
man, fall within the class of persons intended to be protected by
the statutes involved. 1 7
In the past, there has been much debate as to whether violation
of a statute, which caused injury to a fireman or policeman, would
give rise to a cause of action despite the fireman's rule."18 While
there does not seem to be a clear majority either way, New York,
the first state to break from the original fireman's rule in the
Meiers case,"19 has declared that the legislature "may be consid-
ered as having intended to impose liability in any case where
116. CAL. EviD. CODE § 669, subd. (a) (4) (West 1966). The violation must also
have been the proximate cause of the injury of the type which the statute was
designed to prevent. Vesley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164-65, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 623, 632 (1971) (plaintiff injured by an automobile driven by a person to
whom defendant, a tavern keeper, had sold alcoholic beverages in violation of stat-
ute); 4 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAw 2810-11 (8th ed. 1974). An example of this
would be a defendant running a red light and hitting the plaintiffs car which was
coming in the opposite direction. The violation of the statute (running the red
light) would have been the proximate cause of the accident, and avoiding colli-
sions with cars coming in the opposite direction would have been an injury the
statute was designed to protect against.
By recognizing the validity of the above "negligence per se" rule, the Walters
court impliedly recognized that the fireman's rule does not preclude recovery
when the defendant has violated a statute under the above required condition. 20
Cal. 3d at 206-07, 571 P.2d at 613, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 156. The only reason the Walters
court did not apply the "negligence per se" doctrine was that they did not find the
police officer within the statutorily protected class.
117. 28 Cal. 3d at 485-86, 490, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
118. See note 16 supra.
119. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
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there is any practical or reasonable connection between a [statu-
tory] violation and the injury or death of a fireman."120 Conse-
quently, New York has a statute which provides that a fireman
may recover for injuries caused as a result of a fire prevention or-
dinance. 121 This would of course include injuries sustained in a
fire caused by such a statutory violation.122 While there is no
such express California statute conferring a cause of action on
firemen and policemen, it is important to examine the intent of
the legislature in enacting the statutes in question here. Were
firemen and policemen meant to be protected by these statutes?
Hubbard was charged with violating Vehicle Code section
2800.1,123 Penal Code section 148,124 and Penal Code section
834a. 125 Section 2800.1 makes it a misdemeanor to willfully disre-
120. McGee v. Adams Paper and Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 195, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698,
710 (1966) (statutory smoking restrictions did not apply to all premises and parts
of where paper and paper products were stored). See Dagget v. Keshner, 284 A.D.
733, 736, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524, 528 (1954) (when the basis for recovery is under a statute
it is not necessary that plaintiff show "the same degree of proximate causal con-
nection . . ").
121. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 205-a (McKinney 1974) provides in relevant part that
any death or injury to a fireman caused
directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect omission, wilful or culpable
negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the require-
ments of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of
the federal, state, county, village, town, or city governments . .. [That
person shall be liable for,] . . . in case of injury to person, not less than
one thousand dollars, and in case of death not less than five thousand dol-
lars ....
122. See Carrol v. Pellicio Bros., Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 822, 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1964)
(defendant violated a fire prevention ordinance and two smoke ordinances).
123. CAL. VEH. CODE § 2800.1 (West Supp. 1981) provides that:
Every person who, while operating a motor vehicle, hears a siren and
sees at least one lighted lamp exhibiting a red light emanating from a ve-
hicle which is distinctively marked and operated by a member of the Cali-
fornia Highway Patrol or any peace officer of any sheriff's department or
police department wearing a distinctive uniform and who, with the intent
to evade the officer, willfully disregards such siren and light, and who flees
or otherwise attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer's motor vehicle, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West 1970) provides that:
Every person who wilfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer,
in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his office, when no
other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West 1970) provides that "[i]f a person has
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he
is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from
using force or any weapon to resist such arrest."
gard an officer's siren and red light and flee or attempt to elude
pursuit. The majority stated that this section clearly was
designed to protect the public from the hazard of high speed pur-
suits.126 While this contention may be correct, the majority cited
no authority for it and tends to forget that an officer involved in
such a chase may be killed or seriously injured just as easily as
anyone else.
Section 148 proscribes willful resistance, delay or obstruction of
a police officer, while section 834a forbids using force or a weapon
to resist arrest. The majority relied on Walters for its contention
that "an officer called to enforce a criminal statute is [ordinarily]
not one of the class of persons for whose protection the criminal
statute is adopted."127 This may be true for such ordinary crimi-
nal statutes as those for robbery, burglary, larceny, assault and
battery. However, unlike Walters, in the Hubbard case the stat-
utes Boelt violated have a special connection to the safety of a po-
lice officer. As Justice Tobriner stated in the dissent, they "are
concerned specifically with ensuring that a person facing arrest
does not commit additional acts which may pose increased risks
both to the police officer and to the general public."128 Despite
the language of the statutes involved and the past interpretation
of these two statutes, the majority arrived at the amazing conclu-
sion that the statutes "may have been enacted to assist the officer
in making arrests and performing other official functions, but it is
unlikely that these provisions were intended to protect the officer
from injuries received from traffic accidents."129
First of all, it is important to point out that in the case of McAl-
lister v. Cummings a policeman was allowed a recovery for inju-
ries he sustained in a traffic accident while in pursuit of a traffic
violator.130 The driver with whom the police officer collided was
obviously in violation of some traffic ordinance,131 yet there was
126. 28 Cal. 3d at 486, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 709. It is interesting that
the majority did not think that section 2800.1 was designed to protect policemen,
considering that this law was strongly supported by the California Peace Officers
Association. See Crimes; unlawful flight by a motor vehicle operator, 9 PAc. L.J.
434 (1978).
127. 28 Cal. 3d at 486, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (citing Walters v.
Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 571 P.2d 609, 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 152 (1977)).
128. 28 Cal. 3d at 490, 620 P.2d at 162, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 712 (dissent).
129. 28 Cal. 3d at 486, 620 P.2d at 159, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
130. The McAllister court found that a statute intended for public safety is
meant to protect policemen as well as the public, and that "assumption of the risk
is not available as a defense to an action based upon the violation of a safety law
intended to protect the plaintiff against the very risk which he is said to have as-
sumed." 191 Cal. App. 2d 1, 11-12, 12 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (1961) (citing Ewing v.
Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 623, 336 P.2d 561, 564 (1959). See Finnegan v. Royal Re-
alty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950).
131. The defendant violated CAL. VEH. CODE § 21804 (West 1971), which re-
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no discussion that traffic ordinances were not enacted to protect
policemen, as well as the general public.
Section 834a was enacted to do away with the former rule that a
person could use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest.
132
"The former rule inevitably led to riots and violence ... ,"133 The
section provides that if a person knows he is being arrested by an
officer, he has the duty to refrain from using force or a weapon to
resist arrest. If this statute is not designed to protect police of-
ficers, just who is it designed to protect? The police officer is the
one making the arrest. Obviously, the statute is for general public
protection. However, would not a police officer be the one most
likely to be injured if a violator were to use force or a weapon in
resisting arrest? Since the statute specifically refers to police of-
ficers, would not it be logical to assume they would be protected
by it?
Section 148 has been interpreted in the case of People v.
Martensen*134 There, a police officer was attempting to ticket a
speeding motorist who he had pulled over and stopped. While the
police officer was attempting to get information from the defend-
ant driver, the defendant pushed the officer off the running board
of the car.135 The court in Martensen applied section 148, saying
that anyone who "willfully refuses, delays, or obstructs a public
officer in the discharge [of his duties] . . . is punishable .... ,,136
The police officer could have been injured in that case by the con-
quired a driver entering or crossing a highway from public or private property to
yield the right-of-way to all approaching vehicles on the highway. If this section is
for the protection of policemen as the McAllister court dictates (see note 130
supra), how can section 2800.1 not be for the protection of the policeman?
132. People v. Burns, 198 Cal. App. 2d 839, 841, 18 Cal. Rptr. 921, 922 (1961) (not
error to refuse to instruct jury that a private person had the right to reasonably
resist an unlawful arrest). See also People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74
Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969) (a person may not use force to resist any arrest, lawful or un-
lawful, except to defend life and limb); People v. Gaines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 141, 55
Cal. Rptr. 283 (1966) (defendant struck officer with officer's billy club after being
arrested); In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966) (it was delay
and obstruction when defendant made his body go limp and forced officer to carry
him to make the arrest). All of the above cases, except Bacon, deal with a defend-
ant being prosecuted for committing assault and battery against a police officer. It
seems clear from these factual situations that where sections 148 and/or 834a were
involved, these statutes were enacted primarily for the protection of the arresting
police officer.
133. People v. Burns, 198 Cal. App. 2d 839, 841, 18 Cal. Rptr. 921, 922 (1961).
134. 76 Cal. App. 763, 245 P. 1101 (1926).
135. Id. at 766, 245 P. at 1102.
136. Id. at 766, 245 P. at 1102.
duct of the defendant. In Hubbard, the officer was less fortunate
in that he was actually injured. In both the Hubbard and Marten-
sen cases the defendant driver was attempting to avoid getting a
speeding ticket. Although there may be other purposes for this
section, such as protecting other drivers on the road, one purpose
clearly is to protect the police officer from evasive conduct
whereby he may be injured while attempting to give a traffic tick-
et or make an arrest.137
To summarize, a common sense reading of section 2800.1 would
indicate that it was meant to protect police officers as well as the
general public. A similar reading of sections 834a and 148 and
past court interpretations would seem to imply that these are not
the kind of statutes to which Walters referred when the court said
that policemen were not in the class meant to be protected by or-
dinary criminal statutes. If this is the case, Hubbard should have
had a cause of action against Boelt for Boelt's violation of these
statutes, which proximately caused Hubbard's injuries.
X. DISCUSSION OF SPEEDER LIABII.rY
Can a police officer, injured in an automobile accident during a
chase, recover from the speeding driver he was pursuing, when
that driver's negligent or willful and wanton operation of his vehi-
cle was the proximate cause of the injury the policeman suffered?
This has been the issue discussed throughout this note. The ma-
jority of the court found that because of the fireman's rule and be-
cause policemen were not a statutorily protected class, a cause of
action was not stated. This author suggests that the majority
made a serious error when they extended the fireman's rule to
the above factual situation, and that another approach should
have been adopted, just as in other jurisdictions.
The fact of the matter is that in the above factual situation (po-
lice officer pursuing a speeding driver) the fireman's rule has
never been applied. Instead, the general principles of negli-
gence138 have always been applied and a cause of action has been
137. A review of the legislative history of section 148 reveals that one of the ma-
jor laws on which it was based was the Crimes and Punishment Act (Stats 1850 ch.
99 § 92 at 240) as amended by Stats 1860 ch. 156 § 1 at 125. That act stated that "[iIf
any person shall, knowingly and willfully... assault or beat any such officer [at-
tempting to make an arrest] . . .every such person so offending shall be fined in
any sum not exceeding $5,000, and imprisoned in the county jail for a term not ex-
ceeding 5 years. . . ." Since that act specifically mentions assaulting and beating
an arresting officer it seems obvious that section 148 was likewise enacted to pro-
tect against the assaulting and/or beating of an arresting officer, and any other in-
jury which might befall that officer as a consequence of the defendant's resisting
arrest.
138. See note I supra.
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ailowed for policemen.139 The first case to deal with speeder lia-
bility to a pursuing police officer was Warner v. Strieder.140 The
court found that the speed of the defendant was not the proxi-
mate cause of the policeman's collision with a third vehicle.'41
Nothing was said in the case about the fireman's rule.142 How-
ever, the court pointed out, by way of dictum, that if there had
been adequate evidence that the defendant was knowingly at-
tempting to escape, "a situation suggesting liability might en-
sue."' 43 In three later cases, McKay v. Hargis,4 4 Goddard v.
Williams,145 and Martin v. Rossignol,146 the main issue was that
139. See notes 144-60 infra and accompanying text.
140. 72 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1947). In Warner, the defendant was driving at
seventy-one miles per hour at night in a densely populated residential area. When
a police officer began to pursue him, the defendant accelerated. During the chase
the police officer collided with a third vehicle and injured the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff brought suit against both the speeding motorist and the pursuing officer (who
was dismissed from the suit).
141. At the time the collision occurred the police car was overtaking and begin-
ning to pass the speeder in the intersection. The court found that the police officer
was a cause of the accident because of that conduct, and stated that "the situation
in which the officer found himself was the result of his own deliberate conduct and
choice and no act, upon the part of the defendant, induced or caused the officer to
choose the position which resulted in the impact with the plaintiff." Id. at 475.
142. This can be explained because the policeman did not bring the action.
143. Id. See Reynolds v. Hart, 26 Ohio L. Rptr. 256 (1927), where the court al-
lowed an instruction to the jury that if extra speed was necessary to pursue a vio-
lator, it would be the officer's duty to pursue in that situation. Other jurisdictions
have clearly followed this idea, which tends to negate finding the pursuing officer
contributorily negligent simply because he pursued at a high rate of speed. See
Miami v. Horne, 198 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1967); Brechtel v. Lopez, 140 So. 2d 189 (La. Ct.
of App. 1962); Wrubel v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 878, 174 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
144. 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.2d 456 (1958). While pursuing a traffic violator, the
defendant violator accelerated to eighty-five to ninety miles per hour in a forty-five
mile per hour zone. The police car collided with a tree while in pursuit. The court
itself did not address the specific issue of the speeder's liability to the pursuing
police officer. However, the court did uphold a jury verdict of $20,000 for the police
officer against the speeder on the general grounds of negligence.
145. 251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959). While being pursued by a police officer,
the speeder tried to make a left turn into a driveway. The officer, who was at-
tempting to pass the speeder from the rear, collided with the speeder's car. Both
the speeder and the police officer sued each other for their injuries, each alleging
negligence. While the court did not question that a cause of action existed for
both parties, it ordered a new trial on other grounds.
146. 226 Md. 363, 174 A.2d 149 (1961). In Martin a police officer was pursuing a
speeder in a high speed chase (100 miles per hour at times), who he believed had
struck and run down another officer. The speeder attempted to make a left turn
and his car rolled over in front of the pursuing policeman. The policeman was in-
jured in the collision which ensued. This case, like McKay, also addressed the is-
sue of contributory negligence on the officer's part and said nothing specific about
the duty owed by the speeder to the pursuing patrolman. Again however, the
of contributory negligence on the part of the police officer. Again,
nothing was said about the fireman's rule.147
Although none of the above four cases specifically discussed
the duty of a speeding motorist to a pursuing police officer, all
four cases did recognize that a cause of action exists against the
speeding driver. Furthermore, in McKay and Martin the courts
upheld jury verdicts for the police officer against the defendant
speeder, for injuries incurred in an accident which was caused by
the high speed chase. It is significant to note that despite the
wide spread acceptance of the fireman's rule, it was not applied in
any of the above four cases.' 48 Instead, the decisions were based
on the general principles of negligence, and not one of them even
discussed the fireman's rule. Perhaps the "speeder" factual situa-
tions do not lend themselves to an application of the fireman's
rule.
When faced with the "speeder" factual situation which was out-
lined at the beginning of this discussion, courts have always ap-
plied the general principles of negligence.149 In California, in
order for a negligence cause of action for personal injuries to be
successful, the injury must have been foreseeable by the average
reasonable person, and the negligent conduct of the defendant
must have been the proximate cause of the injury. 50 In the case
of Brechtel v. Lopez,' 5' both of these elements were found by the
court. In awarding damages to the injured police officer, the court
observed that the criteria for establishing liability is "whether the
person who created the danger could or should reasonably have
foreseen that the accident or injury might occur."'15 2 There was
such foreseeability when the speeding driver accelerated to
speeds in excess of eighty-five miles per hour, heard the police of-
ficer's siren, saw the officer pursuing him, and then suddenly
turned causing the brakes to grab. The court also found that "the
court did uphold the trial court's judgment in favor of the policeman on the gen-
eral principles of negligence. The subject of the fireman's rule was never brought
up.
147. In these three cases the police officer was suing the speeder. Could it be
that the fireman's rule was not brought up because it had never been applied in
this type of factual situation; nor was it meant to? This author would answer in
the affirmative.
148. See notes 151-60 infra and accompanying text for what type of standard
has been applied in the "speeder" factual situation.
149. See note 1 supra.
150. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
151. 140 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 1962). Defendant's (owner of the car) minor son
was participating in a "drag race" when the chase began. When the brakes on the
defendant's car grabbed, the police car swerved off the road into a utility pole, in-
juring the police officer.
152. Id. at 193.
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proximate cause of the accident was speed, the grossly excessive
speed of young Lopez which induced the speed of the police, who
not only had the right but the duty to attempt to overtake and ap-
prehend him."'I 3
In City of St. Petersburg v. Shannon15 4 the court, citing exten-
sively from Brechtel and relying also on McKay and Martin,155
held that the defendant, who had violated numerous traffic laws
and was being pursued by the plaintiff police officer, could reason-
ably foresee that an accident could occur because of this high
speed chase and that speed alone was the proximate cause of the
accident.l5 6
In MacDonald v. HaI' 5 7 a Maine police officer was pursuing a
felony suspect in a high speed chase when suddenly the defend-
ant suspect applied his brakes and "fish tailed" in front of the on-
coming police car. The police officer put on his brakes and the car
153. Id. at 193. In holding that police officers had the duty to pursue the fleeing
speeder, the court pointed out that pursuit at a high rate of speed alone is not
enough to constitute contributory negligence on the part of the policeman. Id.
The court's reasoning was that the police officer had a duty to pursue and it would
not be right if this duty could be invoked by the law violator as a legal defense
against a suit for damages. Id.
The court relied entirely upon the general principles of negligence in establish-
ing liability. It found negligence per se in violation of the statute, id. at 192, lack of
contributory negligence in the duty to pursue, id. at 193, and, finally, the defend-
ant's responsibility for foreseeable intervening causes springing from the creation
of a hazardous condition. Id.
154. 156 So. 2d 870 (Fla. D.C. of App. 1963). In this case, the defendant was driv-
ing in a reckless manner and at a high rate of speed. With its red light flashing
and siren sounding, the police car gave chase. While traveling at this high rate of
speed the police car hit a curb and was damaged, with serious injuries resulting to
the plaintiff policeman.
155. The court relied on McKay and Martin on the issue of contributory negli-
gence. The rationale in those two cases, as it was in Brechtel, was that the officer
had the duty to pursue, and that pursuing at a high rate of speed, without any
reckless conduct, was not enough alone to constitute contributory negligence on
the officer's part.
156., City of St. Petersburg is an important case because it recognized that
speed alone by the defendant could be the proximate cause of the accident. This
was pointed out and emphasized by Chief Justice Smith in his dissent. 156 So. 2d
at 874. In Brechtel, the proximate cause of the accident was the speeder turning,
causing his brakes to grab. Likewise, in McKay, the police officer lost control of
his car when the speeder made a sudden left turn from the right hand lane; and in
Martin, the speeder making a left hand turn caused his car to turn over and col-
lide with the pursuing officer's car.
157. 244 A.2d 809 (Me. 1968). The court held that the jury could consider the
driving conduct of the defendant during the entire chase in determining the de-
fendant's negligence, not just at the time of, or immediately preceding, the acci-
dent. Id. at 813.
skidded off the road and rolled over resulting in the officer's
death. In ordering a new trial the court explained that,
[t]he operator [of the car being pursued] must foresee or reasonably
anticipate, upon his failure to seasonably stop that the officer may pursue
him, and in such pursuit that speed limits may be exceeded, and that the
pursuing car may be driven closer to the rear of his car than would ordi-
narily be sanctioned by rule of the road, and eventually overtake him and
cause him to stop. He is bound to anticipate that such pursuit invites dan-
ger, not only to all users of the highway, but to the occupants of the re-
spective vehicles. He has induced a race in which only the officer has a
right, by virtue of his sworn duty, to participate. Here by uncontroverted
evidence the defendant was aware that a deputy sheriff was pursuing him.
He was negligent as a matter of law.
15 8
Soon thereafter in 1970, in the case of Rhea v. Green,159 Colo-
rado recognized this cause of action for a policeman against a flee-
ing speeder. In affirming a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff
policeman, the court applied the general principles of negligence
and relied on Brechtel in finding that "the danger to the plaintiff
and others resulting from the defendant's conduct was clearly
foreseeable, and the trial court was correct in ruling that the de-
fendant's negligence constituted a proximate cause of the acci-
dent as a matter of law."1 60
Although the above cases are not California cases, their hold-
ings should be adopted as California law for three previously dis-
cussed reasons. First, the fundamental underpinnings of the
fireman's rule, assumption of risk and public policy, do not merit
extending the rule to willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Sec-
ondly, in cases of fleeing speeders, the independent act of
reckless flight will usually be the cause of the pursuing officer's
injuries. Where an independent act is the cause of the harm to
the officer, the fireman's rule cannot be applied. Thirdly, police
officers are a statutorily protected class by traffic and arrest ordi-
nances, and the fireman's rule should not be applied to circum-
vent these statutes. Since the fireman's rule should not be
applied to this type of factual situation, it seems only fair and cor-
rect to apply the general principles of negligence just as other ju-
risdictions have done.
If the principles of foreseeability and proximate cause were ap-
plied to factual situations like Hubbard, there is no doubt that a
cause of action for policemen against fleeing speeders would be
recognized. In Hubbard, Boelt knew that Hubbard was pursuing
158. Id. at 814.
159. 476 P.2d 760 (Colo. App. Ct. 1970). In Rhea the defendant speeder, who had
violated numerous traffic ordinances, was fleeing arrest. While pursuing the
speeder, two police cars collided in an intersection. The injured police officer was
a passenger in one of the pursuing police cars.
160. Id. at 761.
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him because Hubbard had turned on his flashing light and siren,
and because Boelt accelerated to a high rate of speed to get away.
By applying the line of analysis in the above cases to the facts of
Hubbard, it is clear that a different holding would result, for Boelt
knew that he was exposing himself, others and Hubbard to a high
degree of danger. In other words, an accident was foreseeable by
him as a result of his willful and wanton conduct. Furthermore,
had Boelt not fled at a high rate of speed, the accident in question
would not have occurred. In other words, his conduct was the
proximate cause of the accident, and hence Hubbard's injuries.161
Another interesting comparison to make with Hubbard is that
of Brechtel, City of St. Petersburg, McDonald and Rhea, where the
defendant speeders had all violated various traffic ordinances. All
four courts found this to be negligence per se and the proximate
cause of the accident as a matter of law.162 Although the courts
did not discuss the traffic ordinance involved, one can assume
that due to application of the negligence per se doctrine' 63 the
pursuing officers must have been within the class of persons
those traffic ordinances were designed to protect. Knowing this, it
is all the more baffling why the Hubbard majority, in an almost
identical factual situation, did not find officer Hubbard to be
within the protected class of the statutes involved in that case.
Based on the foregoing cases and the statutes themselves, 164
Boelt should have been found negligent as a matter of law, and
Hubbard's cause of action should have been allowed.
In summary, this cause of action has become part of the law of
Maine, 165 Florida,166 Louisiana,167 Colorado,168 Michigan,169 Mary-
land1 70 and North Carolina.171 None of the above mentioned cases
even discussed the fireman's rule in allowing a cause of action for
policemen in situations of fleeing speeders. The reasoning is
161. Boelt's conduct which caused the accident was traveling at a reckless, ex-
cessive speed while attempting to pass a car on a curve. Hubbard, when trying to
avoid the accident, injured himself. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
162. See 140 So. 2d at 192; 156 So. 2d at 871; 244 A.2d at 814 476 P.2d at 761.
163. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 123-37 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 157-58 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 154-56 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 151-53 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 159-60 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 144 supra.
170. See note 146 supra.
171. See note 145 supra.
clear. Public policy would not be served if police officers injured
in the performance of their duty were not protected, while a crim-
inal, who has brought about the injury through his willful, wanton
or reckless misconduct, is totally absolved of civil liability. Such
logic should apply whether the officer is in California or some
other state. Just as the above courts established, such determina-
tion of liability should be based on the general principles of negli-
gence, not totally erased by a rule which was never meant to
apply to such a situation.
There is substantial support in both the case law of other juris-
dictions 172 and statutory support, in states like New York,173 that
a cause of action should be allowed when someone intentionally,
willfully or knowingly endangers the life of a policeman by speed-
ing in an attempt to evade arrest. Recovery should be based on
the general principles of negligence, 74 not barred by inappropri-
ately applying the fireman's rule. Specifically, there should be a
cause of action for speeder liability "where (1) the police officer
believes that a statute has been violated; (2) is engaged in pur-
suit; (3) there is clear evidence that the speeder knew of the pur-
suit; and (4) an injury occurred as a consequence of the
pursuit." 7 5 Public policy should require that this cause of action
be recognized. There can be no burden on the general public
when someone who willfully and wantonly endangers the life of a
police officer and others is held liable for such conduct.
XI. CONCLUSION
By extending the fireman's rule to willful and wanton conduct,
the majority has applied the rule to conduct for which it was
never meant. The philosophical underpinnings of the rule do not
support this extention, nor does past case law. Furthermore,
based on California case precedent, an independent act of mis-
conduct was involved in this case, and policemen were a statuto-
rily protected class for this type of injury. Therefore, the
fireman's rule should not have been applied to begin with, even if
the conduct involved had only been negligent in nature. The ap-
plication of this ruling will be extremely burdensome on police-
men. Speeders will be allowed to willfully endanger the life and
limb of policemen without any fear or civil liability, while police-
men, who are doing their best to protect citizens from reckless be-
172. See notes 144-62 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 1, and 149-50 supra and accompanying text.
175. See Note, supra note 68, at 231.
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havior, will be allowed no redress in the courts. 176 The far wiser
approach seems to be to allow a cause of action for policemen
based on the general principles of negligence, an approach long
recognized by many other jurisdictions.
MARTY K. DENISTON
176. In reality it is the taxpayers who must pay for this type of conduct through
workman's compensation and disability benefits.

